Introduce mod_privileges: a platform-specific module offering enhanced

security and a (limited) solution to the "perchild" problem.


git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@713961 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
This commit is contained in:
Nick Kew
2008-11-14 09:48:39 +00:00
parent aac5199100
commit 466af3e421
4 changed files with 720 additions and 0 deletions

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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE modulesynopsis SYSTEM "../style/modulesynopsis.dtd">
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="../style/manual.en.xsl"?>
<!-- $LastChangedRevision: 703441 $ -->
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<modulesynopsis metafile="mod_privileges.xml.meta">
<name>mod_privileges</name>
<description>Support for Solaris privileges and for running virtual hosts
under different user IDs.</description>
<status>Experimental</status>
<identifier>privileges_module</identifier>
<compatibility>Available in Apache 2.3 and up, on Solaris 10 and
OpenSolaris platforms</compatibility>
<summary>
<p>This module enables different Virtual Hosts to run with different
Unix&trade; <var>User</var> and <var>Group</var> IDs, and with different
<a href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>Solaris Privileges</a>. In particular, it offers a solution to the
problem of privilege separation between different Virtual Hosts, first
promised by the abandoned <module>perchild</module> MPM.
It also offers other security enhancements.</p>
<p>Unlike <module>perchild</module>, <module>mod_privileges</module>
is not itself an MPM. It works <em>within</em> a processing model to
set privileges and User/Group <em>per request</em> in a running process.
It is therefore not compatible with a threaded MPM, and will refuse
to run under one.</p>
<p><module>mod_privileges</module> raises security issues similar to
those of <a href="../suexec.html">suexec</a>. But unlike suexec,
it applies not only to CGI programs but to the entire request processing
cycle, including in-process applications and subprocesses.
It is ideally suited to running PHP applications under <strong>mod_php</strong>,
which is also incompatible with threaded MPMs. It is also well-suited
to other in-process scripting applications such as <strong>mod_perl</strong>,
<strong>mod_python</strong>, and <strong>mod_ruby</strong>, and to
applications implemented in C as apache modules where privilege
separation is an issue.</p>
</summary>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostUser</name>
<description>Sets the User ID under which a virtual host runs.</description>
<syntax>VHostUser <var>unix-userid</var></syntax>
<default>Inherits the userid specified in
<directive module="mod_unixd">User</directive></default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).</compatibility>
<usage>
<p>The <directive>VHostUser</directive> directive sets the Unix userid
under which the server will process requests to a virtualhost.
The userid is set before the request is processed and reset afterwards
using <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>Solaris Privileges</a>. Since the setting applies to the
<em>process</em>, this is not compatible with threaded MPMs.</p>
<p><var>Unix-userid</var> is one of:</p>
<dl>
<dt>A username</dt>
<dd>Refers to the given user by name.</dd>
<dt><code>#</code> followed by a user number.</dt>
<dd>Refers to a user by its number.</dd>
</dl>
<note type="warning"><title>Security</title>
<p>This directive cannot be used to run apache as root!
Nevertheless, it opens potential security issues similar to
those discussed in the <a href="../suexec.html">suexec</a>
documentation.</p></note>
</usage>
<seealso><directive module="mod_unixd">User</directive></seealso>
<seealso><directive module="mod_suexec">SuexecUserGroup</directive></seealso>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostGroup</name>
<description>Sets the Group ID under which a virtual host runs.</description>
<syntax>VHostGroup <var>unix-groupid</var></syntax>
<default>Inherits the group id specified in
<directive module="mod_unixd">Group</directive></default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).</compatibility>
<usage>
<p>The <directive>VHostGroup</directive> directive sets the Unix group
under which the server will process requests to a virtualhost.
The group is set before the request is processed and reset afterwards
using <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>Solaris Privileges</a>. Since the setting applies to the
<em>process</em>, this is not compatible with threaded MPMs.</p>
<p><var>Unix-group</var> is one of:</p>
<dl>
<dt>A group name</dt>
<dd>Refers to the given group by name.</dd>
<dt><code>#</code> followed by a group number.</dt>
<dd>Refers to a group by its number.</dd>
</dl>
<note type="warning"><title>Security</title>
<p>This directive cannot be used to run apache as root!
Nevertheless, it opens potential security issues similar to
those discussed in the <a href="../suexec.html">suexec</a>
documentation.</p></note>
</usage>
<seealso><directive module="mod_unixd">Group</directive></seealso>
<seealso><directive module="mod_suexec">SuexecUserGroup</directive></seealso>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostSecure</name>
<description>Determines whether the server runs with enhanced security
for the virtualhost.</description>
<syntax>VHostSecure On|Off</syntax>
<default>VHostSecure On</default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).</compatibility>
<usage>
<p>Determines whether the virtual host processes requests with
security enhanced by removal of <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>Privileges</a> that are rarely needed in a webserver, but which are
available by default to a normal Unix user and may therefore
be required by modules and applications. It is recommended that
you retain the default (On) unless it prevents an application running.
Since the setting applies to the <em>process</em>, this is not
compatible with threaded MPMs.</p>
<note><title>Note</title>
<p>If <directive>VHostSecure</directive> prevents an application
running, this may be a warning sign that the application should be
reviewed for security.</p></note>
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostCGIMode</name>
<description>Determines whether the virtualhost can run
subprocesses, and the privileges available to subprocesses.</description>
<syntax>VHostCGIMode On|Off|Secure</syntax>
<default>VHostCGIMode On</default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).</compatibility>
<usage>
<p>Determines whether the virtual host is allowed to run fork and exec,
the <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>privileges</a> required to run subprocesses. If this is set to
<var>Off</var> the virtualhost is denied the privileges and will not
be able to run traditional CGI programs or scripts under the traditional
<module>mod_cgi</module>, nor similar external programs such as those
created by <module>mod_ext_filter</module> or
<directive module="mod_rewrite">RewriteMap</directive> <var>prog</var>.
Note that it does not prevent CGI programs running under alternative
process and security models such as <a href="http://fastcgi.coremail.cn"
>mod_fcgid</a>, which is a recommended solution in Solaris.</p>
<p>If set to <var>On</var> or <var>Secure</var>, the virtual host
is permitted to run external programs and scripts as above.
Setting <directive>VHostCGIMode</directive> <var>Secure</var> has
the effect of denying privileges to the subprocesses, as described
for <directive>VHostSecure</directive>.</p>
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>DTracePrivileges</name>
<description>Determines whether the privileges required by dtrace are enabled.</description>
<syntax>DTracePrivileges On|Off</syntax>
<default>DTracePrivileges Off</default>
<contextlist><context>server config</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).</compatibility>
<usage>
<p>This server-wide directive determines whether Apache will run with
the <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>privileges</a> required to run
<a href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/content/dtrace/">dtrace</a>.
Note that <var>DTracePrivileges On</var> will not in itself
activate DTrace, but <var>DTracePrivileges Off</var> will prevent
it working.</p>
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostPrivs</name>
<description>Assign arbitrary privileges to a virtual host.</description>
<syntax>VHostPrivs [+-]?<var>privilege-name</var> [[+-]?privilege-name] ...</syntax>
<default>None</default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM).
and when <module>mod_privileges</module> is compiled with the
<var>BIG_SECURITY_HOLE</var> compile-time option.</compatibility>
<usage>
<p><directive>VHostPrivs</directive> can be used to assign arbitrary <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>privileges</a> to a virtual host. Each <var>privilege-name</var>
is the name of a Solaris privilege, such as <var>file_setid</var>
or <var>sys_nfs</var>.</p>
<p>A <var>privilege-name</var> may optionally be prefixed by
+ or -, which will respectively allow or deny a privilege.
If used with neither + nor -, all privileges otherwise assigned
to the virtualhost will be denied. You can use this to override
any of the default sets and construct your own privilege set.</p>
<note type="warning"><title>Security</title>
<p>This directive can open huge security holes in apache, up to
and including running requests with root-level powers. Do not
use it unless you fully understand what you are doing!</p></note>
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
<name>VHostCGIPrivs</name>
<description>Assign arbitrary privileges to subprocesses created
by a virtual host.</description>
<syntax>VHostPrivs [+-]?<var>privilege-name</var> [[+-]?privilege-name] ...</syntax>
<default>None</default>
<contextlist><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
<compatibility>Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (<module>prefork</module> or custom MPM)
and when <module>mod_privileges</module> is compiled with the
<var>BIG_SECURITY_HOLE</var> compile-time option.</compatibility>
<usage>
<p><directive>VHostCGIPrivs</directive> can be used to assign arbitrary <a
href="http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/articles/least_privilege.jsp"
>privileges</a> to subprocesses created by a virtual host, as discussed
under <directive>VHostCGIMode</directive>. Each <var>privilege-name</var>
is the name of a Solaris privilege, such as <var>file_setid</var>
or <var>sys_nfs</var>.</p>
<p>A <var>privilege-name</var> may optionally be prefixed by
+ or -, which will respectively allow or deny a privilege.
If used with neither + nor -, all privileges otherwise assigned
to the virtualhost will be denied. You can use this to override
any of the default sets and construct your own privilege set.</p>
<note type="warning"><title>Security</title>
<p>This directive can open huge security holes in apache subprocesses,
up to and including running them with root-level powers. Do not
use it unless you fully understand what you are doing!</p></note>
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
</modulesynopsis>

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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!-- GENERATED FROM XML: DO NOT EDIT -->
<metafile>
<basename>mod_privileges</basename>
<path>/mod/</path>
<relpath>..</relpath>
<variants>
<variant>en</variant>
</variants>
</metafile>

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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ else
fi
APACHE_MODULE(unixd, unix specific support, , , $unixd_mods_enable)
APACHE_MODULE(privileges, Per-virtualhost Unix UserIDs and enhanced security for Solaris)
APACHE_MODPATH_FINISH

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/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
* contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
* this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
* The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
* (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <priv.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "httpd.h"
#include "http_config.h"
#include "http_protocol.h"
#include "http_log.h"
#include "mpm_common.h"
#include "ap_mpm.h"
#include "apr_strings.h"
/* TODO - get rid of unixd dependency */
#include "unixd.h"
#define CFG_CHECK(x) if (x == -1) return strerror(errno);
#define CR_CHECK(x) if (x == -1) \
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT,0,0, \
"Failed to initialise privileges: %s", strerror(errno))
module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA privileges_module;
/* #define BIG_SECURITY_HOLE 1 */
typedef struct {
priv_set_t *priv;
priv_set_t *child_priv;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
} priv_cfg;
static priv_set_t *priv_setid;
static priv_set_t *priv_default = NULL;
static int dtrace_enabled = 0;
static apr_status_t priv_cfg_cleanup(void *CFG)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = CFG;
priv_freeset(cfg->priv);
priv_freeset(cfg->child_priv);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
static void *privileges_create_cfg(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = apr_palloc(pool, sizeof(priv_cfg));
/* Start at basic privileges all round. */
cfg->priv = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL);
cfg->child_priv = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL);
/* By default, run in secure mode.
* That means dropping basic privileges we don't usually need.
*/
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
/* Hmmm, should CGI default to secure too ? */
/*
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK));
CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC));
*/
/* we´ll use 0 for unset */
cfg->uid = 0;
cfg->gid = 0;
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pool, cfg, priv_cfg_cleanup,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
/* top-level default_priv wants the top-level cfg */
if (priv_default == NULL) {
priv_default = cfg->priv;
}
return cfg;
}
static apr_status_t privileges_end_req(void *data)
{
request_rec *r = data;
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
/* ugly hack: grab default uid and gid from unixd */
extern unixd_config_rec unixd_config;
/* if either user or group are not the default, restore them */
if (cfg->uid || cfg->gid) {
if (setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_setid) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"PRIV_ON failed restoring default user/group");
}
if (cfg->uid && (setuid(unixd_config.user_id) == -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error restoring default userid");
}
if (cfg->gid && (setgid(unixd_config.group_id) == -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error restoring default group");
}
}
/* restore default privileges */
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_default) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error restoring default privileges: %s");
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
static int privileges_req(request_rec *r)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
/* cleanup should happen even if something fails part-way through here */
apr_pool_cleanup_register(r->pool, r, privileges_end_req,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
/* set user and group if configured */
if (cfg->uid || cfg->gid) {
if (setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_setid) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"No privilege to set user/group");
}
/* if we should be able to set these but can't, it could be
* a serious security issue. Bail out rather than risk it!
*/
if (cfg->uid && (setuid(cfg->uid) == -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error setting userid");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (cfg->gid && (setgid(cfg->gid) == -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error setting group");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
}
/* set vhost's privileges */
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, cfg->priv) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error setting effective privileges: %s");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/* ... including those of any subprocesses */
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, cfg->child_priv) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error setting inheritable privileges: %s");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, cfg->child_priv) == -1) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Error setting limit privileges: %s");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
#define PDROP_CHECK(x) if (x == -1) { \
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, s, \
"Error dropping privileges: %s", strerror(errno)); \
return !OK; \
}
static int privileges_drop_first(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
{
/* We need to set privileges before mod_unixd,
* 'cos otherwise setuid will wipe our privilege to do so
*/
priv_cfg *spcfg;
server_rec *sp;
priv_set_t *ppriv = priv_allocset();
/* compute ppriv from the union of all the vhosts plus setid */
priv_copyset(priv_setid, ppriv);
for (sp = s; sp != NULL; sp=sp->next) {
spcfg = ap_get_module_config(sp->module_config, &privileges_module);
priv_union(spcfg->priv, ppriv);
}
PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, ppriv))
PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, ppriv))
priv_freeset(ppriv);
return OK;
}
static int privileges_drop_last(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
{
/* Our config stuff has set the privileges we need, so now
* we just set them to those of the parent server_rec
*
* This has to happen after mod_unixd, 'cos mod_unixd needs
* privileges we drop here.
*/
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(s->module_config, &privileges_module);
/* defaults - the default vhost */
PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, cfg->child_priv))
PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, cfg->child_priv))
PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, cfg->priv))
return OK;
}
static apr_status_t privileges_term(void *rec)
{
priv_freeset(priv_setid);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
static int privileges_postconf(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
{
priv_cfg *cfg;
server_rec *sp;
/* if we have dtrace enabled, merge it into everything */
if (dtrace_enabled) {
for (sp = s; sp != NULL; sp = sp->next) {
cfg = ap_get_module_config(sp->module_config, &privileges_module);
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_USER));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_USER));
}
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC));
CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_USER));
}
/* set up priv_setid for per-request use */
priv_setid = priv_allocset();
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, privileges_term,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
priv_emptyset(priv_setid);
if (priv_addset(priv_setid, PRIV_PROC_SETID) == -1) {
ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, ptemp,
"priv_addset: ", strerror(errno));
return !OK;
}
return OK;
}
static int privileges_init(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
apr_pool_t *ptemp)
{
/* refuse to work if the MPM is threaded */
int threaded;
int rv = ap_mpm_query(AP_MPMQ_IS_THREADED, &threaded);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, rv, ptemp,
"mod_privileges: unable to determine MPM characteristics."
" Please ensure you are using a non-threaded MPM "
"with this module.");
}
if (threaded) {
ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, rv, ptemp,
"mod_privileges is not compatible with a threaded MPM.");
return !OK;
}
return OK;
}
static void privileges_hooks(apr_pool_t *pool)
{
ap_hook_post_read_request(privileges_req, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_REALLY_FIRST);
ap_hook_drop_privileges(privileges_drop_first, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
ap_hook_drop_privileges(privileges_drop_last, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_LAST);
ap_hook_post_config(privileges_postconf, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_pre_config(privileges_init, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
}
static const char *vhost_user(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
cfg->uid = ap_uname2id(arg);
if (cfg->uid == 0) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid userid for VHostUser: ",
arg, NULL);
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *vhost_group(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
cfg->gid = ap_gname2id(arg);
if (cfg->uid == 0) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid groupid for VHostGroup: ",
arg, NULL);
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *vhost_secure(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, int arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
if (!arg) {
/* add basic privileges, excluding those covered by cgimode */
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *vhost_cgimode(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
if (!strcasecmp(arg, "on")) {
/* default - nothing to do */
}
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "off")) {
/* drop fork+exec privs */
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK));
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC));
}
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "secure")) {
/* deny privileges to CGI procs */
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK));
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC));
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
}
else {
return "VHostCGIMode must be On, Off or Secure";
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *dtraceenable(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, int arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
if (err != NULL) {
return err;
}
dtrace_enabled = arg;
return NULL;
}
#ifdef BIG_SECURITY_HOLE
static const char *vhost_privs(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
const char *priv = arg;
if (*priv == '-') {
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, priv+1));
}
else if (*priv == '+') {
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, priv+1));
}
else {
priv_emptyset(cfg->priv);
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, priv));
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *vhost_cgiprivs(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
{
priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&privileges_module);
const char *priv = arg;
if (*priv == '-') {
CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, priv+1));
}
else if (*priv == '+') {
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, priv+1));
}
else {
priv_emptyset(cfg->child_priv);
CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, priv));
}
return NULL;
}
#endif
static const command_rec privileges_cmds[] = {
AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostUser", vhost_user, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Userid under which the virtualhost will run"),
AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostGroup", vhost_group, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Group under which the virtualhost will run"),
AP_INIT_FLAG("VHostSecure", vhost_secure, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Run in secure mode (default ON)"),
AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostCGIMode", vhost_cgimode, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Enable fork+exec for this virtualhost (Off|Secure|On)"),
AP_INIT_FLAG("DTracePrivileges", dtraceenable, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Enable DTrace"),
#ifdef BIG_SECURITY_HOLE
AP_INIT_ITERATE("VHostPrivs", vhost_privs, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Privileges available in the (virtual) server"),
AP_INIT_ITERATE("VHostCGIPrivs", vhost_cgiprivs, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"Privileges available to external programs"),
#endif
{NULL}
};
module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA privileges_module = {
STANDARD20_MODULE_STUFF,
NULL,
NULL,
privileges_create_cfg,
NULL,
privileges_cmds,
privileges_hooks
};