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e22d89c9d6
mod_ssl: Ensure that the SSL close notify alert is flushed to the client.
PR54998.
Submitted By: Tim Kosse <tim.kosse filezilla-project.org>, ylavic
Committed By: ylavic
mod_ssl: SSL_smart_shutdown(): follow up to r1601184.
Use SSL_get_wbio() to comply with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN.
Stop SSL shutdown loop when flush fails.
mpm_event[opt]: Send the SSL close notify alert when the KeepAliveTimeout
expires. PR54998.
Submitted by: ylavic
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1651077 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
551 lines
16 KiB
C
551 lines
16 KiB
C
/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
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* contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
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* this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
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* The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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* (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
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* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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/* _ _
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* _ __ ___ ___ __| | ___ ___| | mod_ssl
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* | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` | / __/ __| | Apache Interface to OpenSSL
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* | | | | | | (_) | (_| | \__ \__ \ |
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* |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_|
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* |_____|
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* ssl_util_ssl.c
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* Additional Utility Functions for OpenSSL
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*/
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#include "ssl_private.h"
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Additional High-Level Functions for OpenSSL
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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/* we initialize this index at startup time
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* and never write to it at request time,
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* so this static is thread safe.
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* also note that OpenSSL increments at static variable when
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* SSL_get_ex_new_index() is called, so we _must_ do this at startup.
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*/
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static int SSL_app_data2_idx = -1;
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void SSL_init_app_data2_idx(void)
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{
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int i;
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if (SSL_app_data2_idx > -1) {
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return;
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}
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/* we _do_ need to call this twice */
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for (i=0; i<=1; i++) {
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SSL_app_data2_idx =
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SSL_get_ex_new_index(0,
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"Second Application Data for SSL",
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NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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}
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void *SSL_get_app_data2(SSL *ssl)
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{
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return (void *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, SSL_app_data2_idx);
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}
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void SSL_set_app_data2(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
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{
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SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, SSL_app_data2_idx, (char *)arg);
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return;
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}
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** High-Level Private Key Loading
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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EVP_PKEY *SSL_read_PrivateKey(const char* filename, EVP_PKEY **key, pem_password_cb *cb, void *s)
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{
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EVP_PKEY *rc;
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BIO *bioS;
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BIO *bioF;
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/* 1. try PEM (= DER+Base64+headers) */
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if ((bioS=BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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rc = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bioS, key, cb, s);
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BIO_free(bioS);
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if (rc == NULL) {
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/* 2. try DER+Base64 */
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if ((bioS = BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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if ((bioF = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) {
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BIO_free(bioS);
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return NULL;
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}
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bioS = BIO_push(bioF, bioS);
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rc = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(bioS, NULL);
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BIO_free_all(bioS);
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if (rc == NULL) {
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/* 3. try plain DER */
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if ((bioS = BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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rc = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(bioS, NULL);
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BIO_free(bioS);
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}
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}
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if (rc != NULL && key != NULL) {
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if (*key != NULL)
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EVP_PKEY_free(*key);
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*key = rc;
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}
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return rc;
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}
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Smart shutdown
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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int SSL_smart_shutdown(SSL *ssl)
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{
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int i;
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int rc;
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int flush;
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/*
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* Repeat the calls, because SSL_shutdown internally dispatches through a
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* little state machine. Usually only one or two interation should be
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* needed, so we restrict the total number of restrictions in order to
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* avoid process hangs in case the client played bad with the socket
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* connection and OpenSSL cannot recognize it.
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*/
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rc = 0;
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flush = !(SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN);
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for (i = 0; i < 4 /* max 2x pending + 2x data = 4 */; i++) {
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rc = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
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if (rc >= 0 && flush && (SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
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/* Once the close notity is sent through the output filters,
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* ensure it is flushed through the socket.
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*/
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if (BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) <= 0) {
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rc = -1;
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break;
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}
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flush = 0;
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}
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if (rc != 0)
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break;
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}
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return rc;
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}
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Certificate Checks
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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/* retrieve basic constraints ingredients */
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BOOL SSL_X509_getBC(X509 *cert, int *ca, int *pathlen)
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{
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc;
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
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char *cp;
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bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL);
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if (bc == NULL)
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return FALSE;
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*ca = bc->ca;
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*pathlen = -1 /* unlimited */;
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if (bc->pathlen != NULL) {
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if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(bc->pathlen, NULL)) == NULL)
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return FALSE;
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if ((cp = BN_bn2dec(bn)) == NULL)
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return FALSE;
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*pathlen = atoi(cp);
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free(cp);
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BN_free(bn);
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}
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
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return TRUE;
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}
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/* convert a NAME_ENTRY to UTF8 string */
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char *SSL_X509_NAME_ENTRY_to_string(apr_pool_t *p, X509_NAME_ENTRY *xsne)
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{
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char *result = NULL;
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BIO* bio;
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int len;
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if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xsne),
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ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL|ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT);
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len = BIO_pending(bio);
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result = apr_palloc(p, len+1);
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len = BIO_read(bio, result, len);
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result[len] = NUL;
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BIO_free(bio);
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ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(result, len);
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* convert an X509_NAME to an RFC 2253 formatted string, optionally truncated
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* to maxlen characters (specify a maxlen of 0 for no length limit)
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*/
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char *SSL_X509_NAME_to_string(apr_pool_t *p, X509_NAME *dn, int maxlen)
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{
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char *result = NULL;
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BIO *bio;
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int len;
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if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, dn, 0, XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
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len = BIO_pending(bio);
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if (len > 0) {
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result = apr_palloc(p, (maxlen > 0) ? maxlen+1 : len+1);
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if (maxlen > 0 && maxlen < len) {
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len = BIO_read(bio, result, maxlen);
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if (maxlen > 2) {
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/* insert trailing ellipsis if there's enough space */
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apr_snprintf(result + maxlen - 3, 4, "...");
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}
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} else {
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len = BIO_read(bio, result, len);
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}
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result[len] = NUL;
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}
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BIO_free(bio);
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return result;
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}
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/* return an array of (RFC 6125 coined) DNS-IDs and CN-IDs in a certificate */
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BOOL SSL_X509_getIDs(apr_pool_t *p, X509 *x509, apr_array_header_t **ids)
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{
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STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names;
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BIO *bio;
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X509_NAME *subj;
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char **cpp;
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int i, n;
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if (!x509 || !(*ids = apr_array_make(p, 0, sizeof(char *)))) {
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*ids = NULL;
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* First, the DNS-IDs (dNSName entries in the subjectAltName extension) */
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if ((names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL)) &&
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(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
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GENERAL_NAME *name;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
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name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
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if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
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ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, name->d.ia5, ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL|
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ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT);
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n = BIO_pending(bio);
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if (n > 0) {
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cpp = (char **)apr_array_push(*ids);
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*cpp = apr_palloc(p, n+1);
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n = BIO_read(bio, *cpp, n);
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(*cpp)[n] = NUL;
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}
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}
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}
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BIO_free(bio);
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}
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if (names)
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sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
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/* Second, the CN-IDs (commonName attributes in the subject DN) */
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subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
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i = -1;
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while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
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cpp = (char **)apr_array_push(*ids);
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*cpp = SSL_X509_NAME_ENTRY_to_string(p, X509_NAME_get_entry(subj, i));
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}
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return apr_is_empty_array(*ids) ? FALSE : TRUE;
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}
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/*
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* Check if a certificate matches for a particular name, by iterating over its
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* DNS-IDs and CN-IDs (RFC 6125), optionally with basic wildcard matching.
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* If server_rec is non-NULL, some (debug/trace) logging is enabled.
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*/
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BOOL SSL_X509_match_name(apr_pool_t *p, X509 *x509, const char *name,
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BOOL allow_wildcard, server_rec *s)
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{
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BOOL matched = FALSE;
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apr_array_header_t *ids;
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/*
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* At some day in the future, this might be replaced with X509_check_host()
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* (available in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later), but two points should be noted:
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* 1) wildcard matching in X509_check_host() might yield different
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* results (by default, it supports a broader set of patterns, e.g.
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* wildcards in non-initial positions);
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* 2) we lose the option of logging each DNS- and CN-ID (until a match
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* is found).
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*/
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if (SSL_X509_getIDs(p, x509, &ids)) {
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const char *cp;
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int i;
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char **id = (char **)ids->elts;
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BOOL is_wildcard;
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for (i = 0; i < ids->nelts; i++) {
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if (!id[i])
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continue;
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/*
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* Determine if it is a wildcard ID - we're restrictive
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* in the sense that we require the wildcard character to be
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* THE left-most label (i.e., the ID must start with "*.")
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*/
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is_wildcard = (*id[i] == '*' && *(id[i]+1) == '.') ? TRUE : FALSE;
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/*
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* If the ID includes a wildcard character (and the caller is
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* allowing wildcards), check if it matches for the left-most
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* DNS label - i.e., the wildcard character is not allowed
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* to match a dot. Otherwise, try a simple string compare.
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*/
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if ((allow_wildcard == TRUE && is_wildcard == TRUE &&
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(cp = ap_strchr_c(name, '.')) && !strcasecmp(id[i]+1, cp)) ||
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!strcasecmp(id[i], name)) {
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matched = TRUE;
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}
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if (s) {
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ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, s,
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"[%s] SSL_X509_match_name: expecting name '%s', "
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"%smatched by ID '%s'",
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(mySrvConfig(s))->vhost_id, name,
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matched == TRUE ? "" : "NOT ", id[i]);
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}
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if (matched == TRUE) {
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (s) {
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ssl_log_xerror(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, p, s, x509,
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APLOGNO(02412) "[%s] Cert %s for name '%s'",
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(mySrvConfig(s))->vhost_id,
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matched == TRUE ? "matches" : "does not match",
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name);
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}
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return matched;
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}
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Low-Level CA Certificate Loading
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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BOOL SSL_X509_INFO_load_file(apr_pool_t *ptemp,
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STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
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const char *filename)
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{
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BIO *in;
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if (!(in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()))) {
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return FALSE;
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}
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if (BIO_read_filename(in, filename) <= 0) {
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BIO_free(in);
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return FALSE;
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}
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ERR_clear_error();
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PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, sk, NULL, NULL);
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BIO_free(in);
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return TRUE;
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}
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BOOL SSL_X509_INFO_load_path(apr_pool_t *ptemp,
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STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
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const char *pathname)
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{
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/* XXX: this dir read code is exactly the same as that in
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* ssl_engine_init.c, only the call to handle the fullname is different,
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* should fold the duplication.
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*/
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apr_dir_t *dir;
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apr_finfo_t dirent;
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apr_int32_t finfo_flags = APR_FINFO_TYPE|APR_FINFO_NAME;
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const char *fullname;
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BOOL ok = FALSE;
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if (apr_dir_open(&dir, pathname, ptemp) != APR_SUCCESS) {
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return FALSE;
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}
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while ((apr_dir_read(&dirent, finfo_flags, dir)) == APR_SUCCESS) {
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if (dirent.filetype == APR_DIR) {
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continue; /* don't try to load directories */
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}
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fullname = apr_pstrcat(ptemp,
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pathname, "/", dirent.name,
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NULL);
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if (SSL_X509_INFO_load_file(ptemp, sk, fullname)) {
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ok = TRUE;
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}
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}
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apr_dir_close(dir);
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return ok;
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}
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Custom (EC)DH parameter support
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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DH *ssl_dh_GetParamFromFile(const char *file)
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{
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DH *dh = NULL;
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BIO *bio;
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if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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BIO_free(bio);
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return (dh);
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}
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#ifdef HAVE_ECC
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EC_GROUP *ssl_ec_GetParamFromFile(const char *file)
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{
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EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
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BIO *bio;
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if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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BIO_free(bio);
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return (group);
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}
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#endif
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/* _________________________________________________________________
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**
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** Extra Server Certificate Chain Support
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** _________________________________________________________________
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*/
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/*
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* Read a file that optionally contains the server certificate in PEM
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* format, possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that
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* should be sent to the peer in the SSL Certificate message.
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*/
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int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain(
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SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int skipfirst, pem_password_cb *cb)
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{
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BIO *bio;
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X509 *x509;
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unsigned long err;
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int n;
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if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal())) == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (BIO_read_filename(bio, file) <= 0) {
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BIO_free(bio);
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return -1;
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}
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/* optionally skip a leading server certificate */
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if (skipfirst) {
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if ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, cb, NULL)) == NULL) {
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BIO_free(bio);
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return -1;
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}
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X509_free(x509);
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}
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/* free a perhaps already configured extra chain */
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
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SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx);
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#else
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if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) {
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sk_X509_pop_free((STACK_OF(X509) *)ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
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ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
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}
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#endif
|
|
/* create new extra chain by loading the certs */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, cb, NULL)) != NULL) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x509)) {
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
BIO_free(bio);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure that only the error is just an EOF */
|
|
if ((err = ERR_peek_error()) > 0) {
|
|
if (!( ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM
|
|
&& ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) {
|
|
BIO_free(bio);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
while (ERR_get_error() > 0) ;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_free(bio);
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* _________________________________________________________________
|
|
**
|
|
** Session Stuff
|
|
** _________________________________________________________________
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *SSL_SESSION_id2sz(unsigned char *id, int idlen,
|
|
char *str, int strsize)
|
|
{
|
|
if (idlen > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
|
|
idlen = SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
/* We must ensure not to process more than what would fit in the
|
|
* destination buffer, including terminating NULL */
|
|
if (idlen > (strsize-1) / 2)
|
|
idlen = (strsize-1) / 2;
|
|
|
|
ap_bin2hex(id, idlen, str);
|
|
|
|
return str;
|
|
}
|